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Podcast of "Money’s Mutation of the Modern Moral Mind: The Simmel Hypothesis and the Cultural Evolution of WEIRDness"

Did Capitalism Make Us Better People?

Reasonably Optimistic Podcast

You’ve probably heard that there are three topics you’re not supposed to discuss in polite company: money, politics, and religion. They’re too controversial, too likely to start fights. So it’s conventional wisdom in our culture that we mostly just don’t. Today, we’re going to talk about all three, because those three have a way of finding us anyway – even if we don’t talk about them – in the choices that we make, in the communities we build, and of course, in the fights we have.

And it turns out that beyond the fact that you’re not supposed to talk about them at the dinner table, those three topics might actually be much more interconnected than we think, in a very surprising way. Take money. We spend our lives trying to get it. We save it. We worry about it, but we rarely talk about it. And when we do talk about it, we’re often framing it as though money is just this terrible thing, tyrannizing over our lives because it makes us greedier and more selfish and more corrupt and less willing to invest in the people around us, or be kind to strangers. That belief has shaped almost everything from our religious traditions to today’s arguments over politics and capitalism, socialism, and the kind of communities we want to live in.

But what if money has done more for us than we think? What if it’s done more than just paid our mortgage or made us richer? What if money actually made us more willing to cooperate with strangers? More likely to judge people by the same set of rules instead of one set for us and another for them? What if it made us more able to imagine obligations that go beyond our close connections of tribe or kin? That’s the argument that economist Cameron Harwick made in his 2023 paper, “Money’s Mutation of the Modern Moral Mind.” I was fascinated by that paper when I read it. And he joins me today to discuss why money may actually have made societies more moral, not less; how it’s reshaped our religion and our community and everything else; and what that can tell us about the political fights that we’re having right now.

Cameron, welcome to the show.

Thank you for having me.

Is Money Really the Root of All Evil?

The Bible famously tells us that the love of money is the root of all evil. You treat that as data rather than a claim about the world. Tell me what you mean by that.

We have a very strong sense that money is something corrupting, and we also have a weak sense that that is something we think. So we have a kind of self-critical orientation toward ourselves over the question of money, as if money has made us worse. But what’s interesting is that most cultures besides our own don’t have this hangup about money in the same way that we do. We’re actually more rigorous than a lot of other places in the world.

I’m reminded of the line from Meet Me in St. Louis, the classic 1940s musical, in which one of the daughters says, “Money, I hate, loathe, despise, and abominate money.” And her father says, “Well, you also spend it.” This is kind of the relationship we have with money: we want it and yet we think it is making us deeply worse somehow, and we think that the world would be better off without it.

You’re right – it’s interesting that we listen to the criticisms, and take those very seriously, when maybe self-criticism should be a sign that maybe we’re doing something right morally. We’ve noticed something wrong.

Hunter-Gatherer Life Wasn’t So Peaceful

There’s a long-running idea in Western thought that money has corrupted a gentler, kinder premodern morality. And your argument is that that’s kind of backwards: that our intuitions about what is gentle and kind are quite modern, and actually rooted in some way in the money economy. So let’s start by talking about what premodern society looks like in contrast, and then let’s roll forward through agriculture and to the modern era.

The background to this is asking why humans would be the kind of creatures that we are: creatures that take things seriously for their own sake, and are not just purely self-interested. And that’s true of foragers, it’s true of us, and it’s true in different ways. You mentioned the stereotype of forager societies. Old anthropologists used to call this primitive communism. As if we’re all putting everything into a pot, taking what we need, and we all love each other.

And what the anthropological literature shows in forager societies all around the world, all throughout history, so far as we know, is that this was very much not nice.

David Graeber the anthropologist argues that reciprocal exchange is something that you do with strangers, and then there’s reciprocal altruism which is what you do with the people in your little band. This idea of open-ended obligations to other people where you do have something of a favor bank, but it’s a much more complicated relationship than “I gave you money, you gave me a candy bar.”

It’s supposed to be open-ended. I never extinguish my obligation to you, nor vice versa. That’s what keeps us bound to each other. And in a lot of ways, it’s not a nice fuzzy feeling. It’s very strict. Chris Boehm the anthropologist has a study where he documented what foragers talk about all day when they’re not doing logistics. Some of it is logistics of the hunt, but more than half of it – I think like 60% of what they talk about – is gossip. It’s like the panopticon on you, and this makes sure that altruism is reciprocal. I give you something but you better give me something back, or else they will be talking.

I remember talking to an anthropologist about what happened if someone was selfish. This is what in game theory you call defection from the group. And he said, “Well, there’s a variety. People will gossip about you. They might say something. They might yell at you. And then if you keep doing it, one day you just get an arrow in your back.” They don’t have police. But if you’ve made enough people mad, then they will either banish you from the group, which unless you can find another group is death itself. Very few people survive very long without others. And if they really don’t like you, they will kill you.

Yeah, it escalates.

So these societies are solving a problem of cooperation. So what happens when we move to agriculture? How did those systems of cooperation change?

The thing about forager society and human society in general is that our moral intuitions are there to solve cooperative problems. That’s very much not obvious to most people. And what’s interesting is that the rational actor model – doing everything in terms of your own private self-interest – actually describes most animals better than it does humans, and it describes forager morality better than it does modern Western morality in a lot of ways, which is very counterintuitive to a lot of people.

So you’re exactly right that we want to think about why humans are moral beings, why humans have the values that they do, in terms of the problems that they solve and how they do better than the selfish benchmark.

Because cooperation is the human superpower. Other than bees – and that’s weird, they’re all genetically related – but for humans, we really stand out in our ability to cooperate with each other compared even to other primates.

Yeah. Nobody cooperates at remotely the same scale, especially with non-kin. Even foragers, which are like 20 to 150 people, that’s bigger than most animals manage with non-kin. And now modern societies are in the millions, billions.

So going back to your original point about what are the problems that foragers are solving, and what are their moral intuitions geared toward: the variance of hunting is very high. If you go hunting every day, the game is big. There’s an antelope out there. You could come back with an antelope maybe every week or two, and on the days you get an antelope that’s way more than you can possibly eat by yourself, and then every other day you’re just really hungry. So better to get a larger group, pool that, share the meat. And this works kind of as insurance. I’ll share with you on days I catch, and then you share with me on days you catch, and we’re all better off. It’s basically time-separated exchange.

And what’s interesting is that in a lot of forager societies, people think of it as everything gets shared, but really only meat gets shared, because meat is the thing that is subject to that high variance. Those sharing norms are doing that work relative to that environment.

That’s really interesting. And I think that’s less understood by a lot of people. We tend to think of it again like they share because they believe that’s good. But in fact, how they share is very contingent on their situations, and it can be quite elaborate.

Why Collective Farming Fails

The other thing was that when they shifted to agriculture, those norms broke down. It wasn’t just that they believed really firmly in the value of sharing. I think if you had asked all of them, they would have said they did, but there’s much less of the “we need group labor to farm and then we’re going to store up the surplus.” It’s much more like “I have a patch of stuff, I tend it, but once I’ve tended it, I can pick it at will.” And so as the anthropologist Hillard Kaplan, who’s now at Chapman, was then at New Mexico, told me, they tried to make it like hunting and they would ring a bell for everyone to go out to the fields in a group, and no one showed up. They basically got the same result that the pilgrims got when they tried a similar thing. We’re all going to collectively farm, and it failed, and they had to divide it into private plots.

It’s interesting that collective farming, all throughout history, ever since the Neolithic Revolution, it’s just something that does not work. What’s interesting in this example is that the sharing norms are not only nonfunctional in this new environment of farming, they’re actually counterproductive, because the sharing now encourages free riding in a way that you can maybe police better in a hunting context, but now you’re not motivating the kind of hard work that is necessary to farm. And so around the Neolithic Revolution, and anytime a community transitions to more farming from foraging, you get more of these private property norms. The sharing norms go away.

Now what’s interesting is that this is kind of the opposite of what’s happened in the modern world. In that example the norms are counterproductive, and so they eventually have to get abandoned. That’s not really happened in a lot of the modern world. We have all these norms that are now maybe otiose, unnecessary, but they are non-instrumental. We believe in them for their own sake. We’re not doing them for something else. And all of a sudden we have better courts. We have a money economy. We are able to provide for ourselves not through our local communities, not through our religious group, not through our local tribe, but now we’re able to interact with each other at arm’s length through monetary transactions. So what do we do with all of our churches and guilds and all these other things that were doing the work of organizing division of labor? These are not now counterproductive like the sharing norms among the Ache. They still exist.

We worry sometimes today about is AI going to take all of our jobs? What happens to all of us if our labor becomes completely unnecessary? Now I’m not convinced that that’s the right way to think about AI, but that’s the world that a lot of our moral norms and institutions have been living in for hundreds of years. They’ve been basically unemployed.

I’m going to stop you here because I want to talk about, as we’re transitioning to agriculture and private property, this is the point at which we start to need instead of norms, we need institutions. Is that a fair way to characterize this?

For sure. As any society scales up, then you’re going to get beyond the point where you can store all that accounting in your head, because all this gossip, it’s essentially their method of accounting. And I mean that very literally in the sense of, here’s my debits, here’s my credits, here’s what I owe you, here’s what you owe me.

And that’s why when we’re mad at someone still, we will frequently rehearse the lengthy, going-on-years list of grievances in some way. We’re tallying: have they been a net contributor to our group, or have they been net debtors?

And here’s all your liabilities now. So as a group gets bigger, the more people you have around you that you’re trying to keep track of, you can’t keep track of that in your head anymore, and you need things like formal institutions, you need things like writing, you need things like law. And these start to get developed. Hunter-gatherers or forager societies, small forager societies, so far as we know – again with the caveat that the ones we observe today are not necessarily representative – but we have no record of any forager society having developed writing, and most of them don’t even have counting. Their number system is one, two, a lot, because they don’t need it. They keep track of the debits and the credits in their head.

The First Writing Was a Receipt

Do you know what the first evidence of writing archaeologically that we have is?

No.

It was a receipt.

Oh yes, I do know this. This is the cuneiform. Not counting some untranslated old things that may or may not be writing. Like at least that we know what it says.

Exactly. Accounting was the killer app of writing things down. We’re getting this now out of our heads into something that we can refer to at will, a kind of canonical version. And that entails new kind of moral norms. You have to now have a sense of the legitimacy of doing that.

But actually, there is a hostility often expressed in societies that are making this transition to writing. We did an episode about The Uprising, which is a film about the peasants’ revolt of the 12th century. And one of the fascinating things about it is that – and this is accurate – they were obsessed with destroying records, because the sense was that the Normans had come in with these formal systems, and the writing was a means to steal from these less modern societies, in which things are allocated institutionally through the church and so forth, but also through a lot of these reciprocal trading methods. And there’s a deep sense that writing, however necessary it is, violates some intuition about how groups should work, that you can just write something down and take it. And you still see that reflected in leftist and even conservative discourse today.

Yeah, people are very skeptical of novel forms of formalization. Bureaucracy, for example, is a very modern extension of that – like formal rules for how we run an organization – and in a lot of ways that’s really good. We couldn’t really do without it, especially at large scales. And yet the word bureaucracy, we think “oh I hate bureaucracy, that’s annoying, terrible, inhuman, cold. I don’t like dealing with it.”

How Money Replaced the Local Community

So then we move to money. Money is invented in the classical world. But most of the economy is not monetized until surprisingly recently, right?

Yeah. The earliest coinage we have, or that we are aware of the existence of, is from Lydia, way back in some thousand BC. So money’s been around for a long, long time. But most trading, most reciprocal exchange, is done within groups. Who’s dealing with money is merchants, is external traders. Most people in most of the world are not really using money for a whole lot of things. You’re not going to the supermarket. You’re providing for yourself within your group with which you share a lot of norms, and you’re committed to those norms together in order to provide for yourself.

Now, you’re right that it’s surprisingly recent when most of us start to encounter money on a day-to-day basis. It’s an urbanized phenomenon. The Dark Ages in Europe, even through the early Middle Ages, were characterized by basically a complete demonetization of Europe compared to the Roman Empire. People were not really using money day-to-day. You start to get a reassertion of the money economy compared to the Roman peak starting in the 12th century, going through the 13th, 14th, 15th, and cumulates very, very slowly. This is able to happen as states become more formal, more regularized, and able to impose common territorial law on their territory in a way that was not the case before.

There’s a neat classic paper in economics showing that as you go down the Rhine River in Germany – and if you’ve seen a map of the Holy Roman Empire, there’s like a thousand of these little principalities – and every one of them will stop you on your journey down the Rhine and will take a tariff here, there. So that you have a lot of fragmentation, economic fragmentation. And within these fragments, money is not much used.

So one of the first things that these expanding and more powerful states do, is to suppress these little principalities. And this paper I mentioned talks about when Napoleon invades. That’s not that long ago in the grand scheme of things. Napoleon takes over that area and removes the ability of these little principalities to tax. That is basically the start of modernity in Germany, because now all of a sudden you have a regularized government that can impose law uniformly. That means I can trade locally and distantly as an individual using money, and you get a lot more market integration. You get a lot more use of money. And this substitutes for the communities that were doing this work earlier. My church doesn’t necessarily have to do as much.

So the church has been providing a coordinating function. I mean, I’m a practicing Catholic. It’s been providing a lot of stuff, but one of the things that it is providing is it’s providing a common morality. And this is when you argue things really start to get WEIRD.

Why Modern Morality Is So “WEIRD”

I want to stop and let’s talk about what WEIRD means, because it’s not what a lot of our audience is thinking when they hear that term.

WEIRD is Joe Henrich’s acronym for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic. It’s basically the psychological syndrome of modernity. It’s a nice cute acronym because it highlights the fact that our moral intuitions today are very, very different from moral intuitions elsewhere in the world and throughout history.

You talk about the Catholic Church providing a common morality, but that’s functional. It’s not something that we’re just nostalgic about and “oh, nice thing to have” – that was doing work. You could not trade in an environment without regularized territorial law. You could not trade internally or externally if you don’t have that common morality. You got to trust people. That’s the basic problem. Or somebody’s going to stiff you, and there’s lots of opportunities for that.

I think of culture as a mind-reading tool. When I have shared religious values that include “thou shalt not steal,” “thou shalt not kill,” etc., it gives me a better ability to predict what someone will do.

Before we go on, let’s talk a bit about signaling and how this plays in. Because it’s not just that I believe these things, that I privately know that stealing is wrong, and I would never do that. Although I think that we underweight how important that is. There are a lot of people who don’t do stuff, not because they’re afraid of getting punished, but because they would be ashamed to do it. But then there’s also the aspect of telling other people, letting them know that you are going to be the sort of person who doesn’t steal. So I want to talk about how we signal that in a forager society, in a premodern society where all of your neighbors may be Muslims, or all of them may be under the influence of the Catholic Church or the Greek Orthodox Church. But you don’t have high state capacity that can catch all the scofflaws and punish them efficiently and put them in jail or what have you. And then what the signaling looks like in a modern society. So can you talk a bit about that? Like why do we need to signal and how do we signal and how does that change?

I think people rebel against signaling explanations because we’ve deeply internalized the Christian ethic of “let not your right hand know what your left hand is doing when you give charity.” Do it because you’re a good person, not because you’re showing off. Non-instrumentally. Every value should be non-instrumental, that’s important to us. Signaling is not incompatible with that. To say that something is signaling is not to say that it is inauthentic, or that I am parading myself around. It’s solving the question of: how do I know what kind of person you are?

And it’s important that I know what kind of person you are, so I know what kind of interactions we can have together. If I think you’re the kind of person who might run off with my money if I buy something from you, I’d like to know that. So the signaling problem is: how do I communicate to you that we share moral commitments, that you can trust me for certain kinds of things, or even if we don’t share moral commitments, the fact that I might have them, that I belong to some community that you know something about, tells you something about me and tells you what you can trust me for or not.

And those commitments do have to be held fairly sincerely.

The basic problem of signaling is: how do I trust you, given that you could be lying to me? And in equilibrium – and when I say in equilibrium I mean when everybody has adjusted to each other adequately – signals are honest. If you’re signaling in an inauthentic way that “I’m this kind of person and I’m being all pretentious about it but I’m faking it,” eventually people are going to know not to believe me.

So the non-instrumentality is really important, because if these moral commitments were instrumental – If it’s like “this would be pretty efficient” or “I’m joining a church because lcommunity is nice” or “I would like a little bit of social insurance that the church might be able to provide for me,” that would be an instrumental approach. You’re not going to be the kind of guy that they can really trust to be there for them in a bind.

What’s interesting about forager societies and the signaling that goes on there is that the moral commitments there are not particularly oriented toward morality. The gods or the spirits or whatever don’t want you to necessarily be a good person. Even up to Greek mythology, Zeus doesn’t care if you’re a good person. Zeus is not a good person. They just want you to sacrifice to them. It’s kind of transactional with them. But this is a credible signal that if I’m sacrificing to the same God that you are, then we are non-instrumentally committed to the same community, and I can trust you in a way that I can maybe not trust somebody who’s sacrificing to a different god.

And may not know the Greek rules of hospitality, or have the same norms about other stuff that will matter. And this is why for example Quakers develop the idea of a single price. The Quakers are these great merchants. And this is why Philadelphia gets so rich, not because it’s so well-located, but because the Quakers form a kind of core merchant class society. But that’s not the first or last time this has happened. You see a lot of minorities who are concentrated religious minorities who also ethnic minorities. Talk a bit about why that is.

This is basically how all premodern specialization worked: you have specialization around some set of shared normative commitments, and a lot of that, you’re right, does survive to the present day. You have ethnic minorities, religious minorities who because they have a non-instrumental commitment to their community, and it’s obvious to you. Quakers would, back in the day, dress in a specific way. You knew who’s a part of this religious community, who has these commitments to these values, to these institutions, and to each other. And I can trust somebody from another community because my community deals with their community as a community, and we have a reciprocal exchange between communities. If they screw me, then now our communities have a beef, and they’d like to avoid that.

This is how long-distance trade gets regularized very, very early in human history. When money comes along, you have a church that’s doing work of organizing a society and providing a common morality so that we can trust each other, provide for each other. All of a sudden we can do that with a money economy. Now the king is providing courts for me that I can take somebody to if somebody wrongs me. I can buy things from somebody without necessarily trusting them because I can give them money. A lot has changed.

But the church isn’t counterproductive. I can keep going to church. That doesn’t hurt me. In fact, I might still enjoy it because I wasn’t doing it instrumentally. Now what I call the Simmel hypothesis, after Georg Simmel who’s a sociologist from about 1900, he had this idea that the money economy freed all these other domains to evolve, according to their own internal logic is the phrase he uses. It’s not just a secularization hypothesis. If we transpose the Ache story to the United States today, we would expect something like a secularization story. Church is doing work, now we don’t need it to do that work, and therefore church membership declines and we become atheists or something like that.

Some of that story you can argue has happened, although it does seem to be leveling off.

Well, you definitely can’t tell a straightforward monotonic decline story.

You would have expected it to happen like a hundred years ago, not now. You would expect all the churches to be gone by now if people were just using church instrumentally as a way to get babysitting and social insurance and so forth.

I’ve seen the argument that the United States today is more religious than it was at the Revolution.

Possibly.

Yes. It’s multi-dimensional, but the secularization hypothesis is clearly not straightforward. People are still going to church, it’s is still doing something for them. So Simmel’s idea is that when you take away the job of structuring a society from a moral norm or a moral institution, it doesn’t necessarily go away, because we were not valuing this for the things that it does for us. We were valuing it for its own sake. And as long as it’s not actively hindering us like it was in the Ache case, we hang on to it. And now it’s unemployed. Now it is not constrained.

Let’s think about the Reformation. The complaint in the Reformation was that the Catholic Church has lost the supposed purity of the early church, where we were all doing this with all of our hearts and not just thinking of this transactionally. Now to what extent is that actually true, I don’t know. But that’s the impression, and certainly the Catholic Church at the time did look a lot more like other social systems than it did like, let’s say, the ideal self-conception of the Christian community.

What Jesus and the Moneychangers Really Meant

It certainly looks a lot different from the early Christians. You talked about the Jesus and the moneychangers in the temple moment. How we moderns understand that is not necessarily how premoderns would have understood that moment

It feels so natural to us. The story here is Jesus goes into the temple, and there are money changers in the temple, and they’re buying and selling these ritual items, chickens that you can sacrifice or something, and they’re doing this in a money-grubbing way. And Jesus gets mad and flips over the tables. And we all read this and we go, “Yeah, Jesus, what are these guys doing here corrupting the temple?” But the thing is that this would not have been weird or unusual at the time. You need to buy a chicken to sacrifice. This would have been true in Jewish religion at the time. This would have been true in Roman religion at the time. It’s very transactional, and that’s kind of okay at the time. And this idea that feels so natural to us now, that’s so central to Christianity’s self-conception – that it’s really about the heart and not the transaction – we shouldn’t underestimate how novel that was at the time, and how novel it remained even throughout most of Christian history.

One way to think about this is that we have real emotional instincts about sharing and reciprocity and so forth, that whether you think they are God-given or evolved in order to cooperate in groups, either way we have them, and either way they are serving that function in those groups. But your argument is that because we have money, because I don’t have to worry that when I’m bartering and I’m giving you wheat and you’re giving me beer, that the beer is watered it down or so forth. When you give me a dollar, I know what I’m getting. And because the growth of the economy enables us, we don’t need as much social insurance from our tribe. Because the state provides law enforcement that substitutes for reputation and blood feuds and so forth, the non-instrumental values that were doing all of this work, they can kind of hypertrophy. They can just grow to fill the entire space of institutions that used to be doing lots of different kind of institutional work. Is that a fair summary?

Yeah. And that’s a great image, hypertrophy. If you imagine these little foam stress balls, they can come in any kind of shape. They could be an apple, a dog, a whatever, a perfect sphere. Let’s suppose you squish all of these in a vice grip. If you’ve squished it into a rigid space, they’ll all be kind of the same shape. And so when you release that pressure, it takes its own shape that it always had internally but was not necessarily able to exhibit. And Simmel’s argument is that something like this has basically happened to our moral norms. That when churches and religions and moral norms in general were doing the work of holding together community, they had to look a certain way. They had to have certain functions. They had to provide the kind of internal and external punishment mechanisms that allow other groups to trust you and interact with them. No matter what your actual scriptures or internal self-conception says, you are bound to provide these things. And so you get a lot of things that look like moral compromises. You get a Catholic Church that looks like it’s not really living up to the radical message of Jesus himself, which is right there in the Bible. And so all of a sudden once the Catholic Church is no longer needing to do that, once that function has been taken over by a territorial state and the money economy, then we get scope for asking: what if we take this more seriously than we’ve been doing? What if instead of providing these internal and external enforcement mechanisms, which we don’t necessarily see much of in scripture as such, what if instead we took the Sermon on the Mount seriously? Why don’t we?

Now, people had been trying to do this for the thousands of years prior to the Reformation, and mostly they didn’t succeed. There were lots of little proto-Reformations that didn’t go anywhere. Not just because they got suppressed, but because they weren’t thinking about how to survive as a community in this environment where the our community has to do certain things. Now communities don’t have to think about that.

But most of our communities now are not economic and legal units. They’re social clubs. I don’t mean that in a diminishing way, but they just don’t have the same internal coherence or existential importance to the members.

Not even subjectively. Even just in terms of what are they doing in terms of your ability to survive? That’s not what they’re there for anymore. Which means they have a lot more freedom to hypertrophy and run off according to, in Simmel’s phrase, their own internal laws. The stress ball now becomes the apple that it always felt like it was.

It always wanted to be deep in its little apple heart.

Why Populists and Socialists Both Want Community

I want to take this to today. I think one way to see what’s happening politically right now is that we’re in a war for these hypertrophied values. On one side you’ve got populists who are longing for a thicker form of community that’s performing more work, but is also vastly larger. They want the kind of small existential community feeling from a large nation-state. And on the other hand, you have the socialists who want the forager feeling from a money economy. They think they don’t want a money economy, although they really probably would not want to go live in the woods with the Ache. It seems like this sense is kind of central to a lot of our political disputes, which I spend too much time writing about.

Returning to the question of why do humans have the kinds of desires that we do as human beings? One of those desires is for a thick community. There was a piece a little while ago by I think an ex-Mormon who was talking about intense socialization and the Mormon mission as something that he looks back on fondly, even though he’s no longer Mormon, because it was hard but personally fulfilling to him. If you talk to people who have been in the military, a lot of them say it was tough, I didn’t necessarily like it at the time, but I’m now really good friends with all the people I was there with, and I look back on that fondly now. Humans seem to be wired for this intense socialization experience that used to be functional, and is now not counterfunctional, but we still have those feelings.

Now we have a mode of economic provision which is much more depersonalized. Nobody’s stopping anybody from having these intense socialization experiences, but a lot of people fall through the cracks. The rebellion against that, I think, is what sociologists, activists, and so on are referring to when they talk about neoliberalism as a bogey. It’s this mode of provision where we don’t have to be intensely socialized. And that sucks for a lot of people.

So what fills that gap? Now all these unemployed norms raise their hands and say, “I’m still here.” We get fundamentalisms. And I say fundamentalisms plural because this can spin off in any number of different directions. It’s been very commonly said that a lot of the distinctive moral scruples of hyper-WEIRD people today are kind of a Christian residue. We have this long civilizational history where what matters is your heart, your intent, which is not true in most of the world. And that has hypertrophied in a sense that today we’re very preoccupied with authenticity, for example. If you say something, we’re very concerned with what should I infer from what you said about what you in fact meant. Like the idea of dog whistles. And that’s the recipient side of a signaling problem. You’re signaling something to me. How should I infer something that I can’t observe from something that I did observe, from something somebody said?

Did you mean it sincerely or are you just saying that because you think I want to hear it? Or are you saying something that your supporters will understand as something very different from what it sounds like? It’s not like we invented worrying about lying, but in a society that’s less economically flourishing and less impersonal, they’re less worried about whether you’re insincere when you say that you enjoyed the wedding, etc., and much more worried about factual lies. Did you tell me something was going to happen that is not true?

Cancel Culture and the Search for Sincerity

What’s interesting about the moral norms of a lot of less developed societies is that sincerity is not really a concern. If you injure somebody or offend somebody and you say, “Oh, I didn’t mean to,” that’s not an excuse. But also, there are rituals where you say, “I’m sorry. I do the sorry ritual. I don’t have to mean it. But if I did the ritual, now we’re good.”

And to be clear, when we say less developed, we mean less economically developed. We’re not drawing judgments between—

Correct. Less monetized, I should say. One of the things that’s been noted with cancel culture today is that you have this intense focus on what did you actually mean? And people talk about consequences, not – what’s the phrase they use?

Yeah, I know what you’re thinking of, and I also can’t think of it. Or there was also like “freedom of speech is not freedom from consequences.” But yes, the obsession with divining someone’s heart, and like did they really mean it? Was their apology sincere enough? Were they showing the appropriate amount of contrition? It does have overtones of Christian fanaticism. We’re interrogating your deep heart, which God knows. We’re not asking whether you did the fasting and the prayer and made the sacrifices in the temple. Sure, anyone can see that, but we’re going deeper.

Yeah, “You did a weak apology.”

Was it the Poetry Foundation where someone got fired because their apology, their proclamation of empathy after the George Floyd thing, was seen as not enough. It wasn’t that they didn’t say it. It was that they hadn’t said it with sufficient fervor.

And now that we’ve seen a signal that you’re not committed, then nothing’s going to update us.

Is there an equivalent on the right today, of that level of “show me your loyalty”?

Yeah. So what worries me about this hypertrophy, this unmooring from economic necessity, is that it initiates a general dynamic of what I’ve called in the past the piety contest. This is the internal logic of the norms that you kind of run away with. That could be something like on the left that’s “are we sufficiently anti-racist?” On the right recently it’s “are we sufficiently horrified at the Charlie Kirk murder?” Like you can’t even say silly things about that right now. Of course there’s a difference of scale there, but it’s the same kind of impulse. That we’re not going to joke about this because that signals something deep about your commitments that we are now not going to ever forget.

Yeah, that was probably the closest to that particular phenomenon that I’ve seen on the right. Although you could also argue that the right is displaying a kind of de-WEIRDing, where we’re getting this intensely personalistic politics, where it’s all wrapped up in Donald Trump and making costly signals of loyalty by, for example, loudly proclaiming that Haitians barbecue cats so that you can be his vice president. That seems to me in some ways like a reversion to the old. And the socialists who want to fix the problem by getting rid of money, maybe they’re backwards. Maybe we need more impersonal transaction, or am I being too cute with that?

No, I think it’s a valid observation, that in a lot of ways Trump is probably the least WEIRD president we’ve had in recent memory. You’re exactly right, it’s very personalistic. Now I don’t know how far this extends to rank and file Republicans, outside of online trolls who will yell at you when you say something bad about Trump. But certainly in terms of the organization of the top echelons of the Republican Party, you have this centrality of the person in a way that is alien to the Western political tradition for a long time.

Can Too Much Empathy Destroy a Society?

You gave a presentation online, which I highly recommend to my listeners on this paper. One thing you talked about there was de-WEIRDing, and this fear that maybe these norms, like as they have sprung out of the row of cans of little squeeze balls – we’re going to take this metaphor as far as it will go – we’re going to picture a whole shelf full of cans of squeezy balls that have been unleashed. But that those might not be stable, that unleashing everything from its container and allowing it to take the largest possible form of its internal logic, maybe that can’t hold.

Yeah, and then it evaporates. That’s a broader worry of mine. One other project I’m working on is a moral philosophy excursion where I argue that we should be concerned with the dynamic stability of the norms that we hold dear. We should be concerned not just with maximizing them, but with making sure that they persist into the future. The opening example I use in this paper is, a couple years ago Elon Musk was on the Joe Rogan podcast and he made this remark that everybody hated. He said that the fundamental weakness of Western civilization is empathy. And people took him to mean that empathy is bad, we should be less empathetic. I don’t think necessarily that follows. People juxtaposed it with this apocryphal quote by Hannah Arendt where she says something to the effect of, “the decline of empathy is one of the most telling signs of a civilization about to fall into barbarism.” Which people again took to mean: “empathy is good.” I don’t think that follows either. In fact, I think you could believe both of those statements. Because if you expand the scope of empathy infinitely, if you take “empathy is good” as an axiom and say therefore empathy should always win over any kind of competing value, that’s not going to survive. If we think of this game-theoretically, “always cooperate” goes extinct very quickly.

Of course we all believe in all of these values, but also it’s complicated and there’s this person here and do I really want to make that big a deal out of it? I have a lot of trade-offs to think about, and we still do that quite frequently in our own lives on smaller stuff. And then you get to something like empathy, which seems like it should be an overriding value. But I think of a small example in my own city where there’s now a debate about what you do with people who don’t pay their rent. Often these people are in quite sympathetic situations. But it’s also obvious that there’s an incentive problem, because the number of people not paying their rent has skyrocketed, even though rents have not been going up that much in DC because our economy is in a local recession. And a lot of what’s going on is just that it got easier not to pay rent and not get evicted for various reasons that I will not tax our audience with. And a lot of the proposals from the left are just like, how can we be super empathetic to these tenants who are struggling in many ways? Now I’m not against being empathetic with tenants, but the way that people keep proposing to help them is just to make it easier not to pay your rent. And the problem with that is that the landlords are now losing so much money that you can’t get anyone to build housing in the district, and affordable housing providers – not like big rich corporate landlords, but nonprofits that are in the business of providing affordable housing – cannot afford to keep going and need bailouts from the government, which is creating further problems. You have to be able to balance all of these considerations. And in small personal groups, people make those trade-offs – I don’t want to say easily, if you’ve ever been on a co-op board, there’s a lot of fighting in these communities over including over incredible trivia – but they do make them in the context of relationships. And making them abstractly is really hard. When you have an abstract value that’s not embedded in the situation of a particular person, it’s really hard to be like, well, of course empathy is good, but what about steel production? People feel bad about discussing those kinds of trade-offs.

Yeah. So if we take that prisoner’s dilemma, and we then put it in a question of I’m interacting with somebody else who I don’t necessarily know about. I’m the kind of guy who would cooperate if you are. I’ve got to figure out, what kind of guy are you? If I can successfully figure out that if you’re a cooperator conditional on me being a cooperator, and if I’m a cooperator conditional on you being a cooperator, we’re both better off than if we did not. Whereas if I go out and I say “cooperation good”, I cooperate with everybody, I am not going to last very long.

Because the people who are willing to take advantage are going to take advantage.

You made a very good point about the tenant protections: what people miss is that there’s not just some a stock of tenants who are in trouble who we want to help, great. And it’s probably fine to help tenants who find themselves in an unexpectedly bad situation. The problem comes when we make a rule of this, we change the number of people who get in trouble. The more indiscriminate we are with our empathy, the more we change the kinds of people that we are interacting with. That’s the dynamic problem that I think is very underrated when people think about moral rules and their application. And you’re right, balancing is important. If we’re monomaniacal or axiomatic about “here is the thing that is good and let’s run as far as we can with that” – and that’s what most modern moral philosophy is – that’s a mistake. You’re going to get bullets you have to bite. You’re going to get changes in the kinds of people that you’re interacting with, in a way that is going to make it very difficult for you to continue with that thing that you maybe rightly value.

So how do we strike the balance? I’m going back to the Democratic Socialists for a minute. They really, really don’t like the idea that money is going to allocate. They have developed this because they’re rich, because they don’t need to be embedded in a community that’s about survival. They can be embedded instead in a community that is about expression, and they want to separate money. They want to remove economic life from markets, and they want to remake these expressive communities where it’s much more about actualizing the self. Everyone should have all of the resources and opportunity they need to completely self-actualize. We should not be limited by economic necessity. Maybe they’re right. But is this also a de-WEIRDing problem? And is this also an example of a value that if you express it, if you allow it its fullest possible expression that like nothing should be about money, is going to undermine the basis of its own survival? I think as a libertarian, I would pretty obviously argue that it would, but I’d like to hear your case for this.

This seems like a case of trying to have your cake and eat it too, and a case in which de-WEIRDing is almost indistinguishable from hyper-WEIRDing on some margins. It’s essentially like the German Romantic impulse, “let’s go back to nature. Let’s rediscover our primitive authentic selves and express that.” But German Romanticism or Romanticism in general – including in its forms that we see today like in the atavist movements you describe – that only exists in a very modern monetized economy. That impulse itself is so modern. Anybody in an actual thick community like this, they try to exit that pretty quick and enter the monetary economy as soon as they can, because the necessity to provide for the actual subsistence of its members constrains these communities. So these communities are thick but they are not expressive. In fact, it’s important that you don’t express yourself. And this goes back to the signaling problem. I can’t just wear whatever I want. I can’t be whoever I want in medieval or Dark Ages Europe or in most of the world, because it is important that I am wearing certain clothes that signal “here are my religious commitments. Here’s the community that I’m a part of. If you get in a dispute with me, here’s who you go to to make sure that I’m in line or for redress.” And if I’m just out here doing my own thing, nobody knows what to do with me and I can’t really interact successfully with anybody else. So there’s a real deep tension between this ideal of authentic expressivity and what do we want thick communities to do?

Why Companies Need More Than Contracts

Let’s land this plane by talking about firms. Ronald Coase, the legendary economist, had this famous question: why do firms exist? He argued – we’ve talked about this before on this podcast – they exist to solve transaction costs. The market way of doing things, with all of these formal layers, has a lot of advantages. It allows us to be more expressive. It allows us to take our norms farther than they could go. But we have to have contracts and we’ve got to send the money, and if it’s a lot of money, we’ve got to write a check and then our bank has to clear the check and so forth. All of those costs, they add up. They’re search costs for finding a deal to do. Whereas if I’m existing in a small community, I know who I’m doing a deal with. It’s Fred. These are all transaction costs. And Coase argued that firms exist to minimize these costs. So if you’re doing deals inside the firm, you’re kind of recreating – should we say, are firms, rather than being the avatar of the cold heartless industrial revolution, are they in fact in some ways the last pure survival of premodern institutions?

There’s a good case for that. Coase had the story about transaction costs, but a lot of follow-up literature shows that you can’t really square this circle. If we think of the firm as a locus of joint production or collective action where we’re working together toward a common goal, there’s no set of pure contracts that will allow us all to regard this purely instrumentally. And any of us who have worked in dysfunctional organizations where people are all pursuing their own self-interest in those, it’s not pleasant to work in. It doesn’t get a whole lot done, and those firms fail. Now there’s a lot of work in the economic anthropology of the firm, thinking of the firm not just as a set of contracts – which it is – but also as a cultural community. There is company culture. We are bound together in a common purpose, and the more we actually believe in that, the more we’re going to be able to accomplish together, because we are not regarding these things instrumentally.

So a lot of things that from the outside we might regard as cringe corporate rituals are actually functional, to the extent that they get people on board. They’re costly signals of “I can rely on you to put the interest of the firm ahead of your own interests.” If I can trust you to do that, and you can trust me to do that, we can do a lot more. We’re seeing this with some AI firms today, which from the outside kind of look cultish. They’re all part of the same polycule or whatever. And it looks so weird from the outside, like why is this linked? And it’s because this allows you to perform collective action much, much more intensively than would otherwise be the case. The more you have in common culturally, the more you can signal that trust to each other and that we’re committed together, you can do a whole lot. And I think that’s exactly what we’ve seen with a lot of these new Silicon Valley firms.

And I think you can actually see what happens when this breaks down with the bankruptcy of this very large, venerable, very profitable law firm, Weil Gotshal, which went from being a functioning profitable firm to not existing in the space of a few weeks. We have an episode on this. When you look at what happened, it seems like they just had a bank run: as profitability fell a little bit, some of the partners started leaving. And because these law firms are a bit like a forager band, they’re just human capital. Computers and the pretty bookcases are not adding significant value to the law firm, other than to signal to clients that they’re a prosperous firm that’s not going anywhere. And so as one partner would walk off with his practice group and their clients, that left more of the fixed costs for the rest of the partners. Then all of them went from cooperate cooperate cooperate cooperate, to defect defect defect, super quickly. And if you don’t have real shared commitments – not “we wrote a mission statement and we said it and everyone thinks it’s kind of cringe and dumb and no one does it” – it’s really important that shared functional but non-instrumental values are holding you together. Because if you don’t, it can all fall apart with incredible speed.

Things work until they don’t. That’s a great example. Even if you’re the kind of person who’s inclined to cooperate, even if you really believe in this law firm, you don’t want to be the last one there.

What Money Makes Possible

The closing question we generally ask is: what are you optimistic about? But let me broaden it a little. What is the most optimistic thing your model predicts?

I recall having a conversation with a friend of mine from grad school who said, “I am not willing to believe in any set of prescriptions that would have foreclosed the Great Divergence, the Industrial Revolution.” This model explains modernity in both its good and its bad aspects, and those are linked. A lot of the good things about modernity – like we can express ourselves in a way that was not really possible before. I like that. I’m a big fan. Just the fact of economic growth, the fact that we can specialize as individuals rather than as ethnic groups or religious groups. I think that’s great. I appreciate a lot of the freedom that we have. So I think the most optimistic thing I could say is that this project explains the successes and it points out the dangers, and if we can walk that tightrope – now, am I optimistic that we will walk the tightrope? I don’t know. But if we can appreciate the successes while being aware of the failure modes, bringing those failure modes into a wider consciousness where we are not just taking our moral intuitions at face value and running with those as far as we can, but thinking – where did those come from? Are they something that we can reasonably expect to persist in the future? If we ask that question, then I’m hopeful that modernity in its good aspects can survive.

I think I would say that it makes me more optimistic about money. I think I like money a little more than I did because I like freedom and liberty and all of these things. But I also think it should make other people more pessimistic about the idea that there’s no tradeoffs. You’ve got to take the good with the bad, which is a recurring message of my show.

But this was delightful. Thank you for sharing your time with us altruistically without thought of payment. It’s been a pleasure.

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