A co-ordinated administrative division between infantry, cavalry, and artillery, usually organized by the state, would normally defeat forces in which these activities were mixed up—at least in ‘high intensity’ warfare.#
The laws of the feudal states in Europe were reinforced by rules descending from Roman law (especially property law), Christian codes of conduct, and Germanic notions of loyalty and honour.#
Where stateless societies conquer ones with states, they either themselves develop a state or they induce social regress in the conquered society.#
[Besides the state,] only three alternative bases for order exist: force, exchange, and custom, and none of these are sufficient in the long-run. At some point new exigencies arise for which custom is inadequate; at some point to bargain about everything in exchange relations is inefficient and disintegrating; while force alone, as Parsons emphasized, will soon ‘deflate’. In the long-run normally taken for granted, but enforceable, rules are necessary to bind together strangers or semi-strangers.#
We can estimate that in Near Eastern imperial societies up to Alexander the Great the maximum unsupported march possible for an army was about 60-75 miles. Alexander and the Romans may have extended it to nearly 100 miles, and this remained the maximum until the eighteenth century in Europe when a massive rise in agricultural productivity provided the logistical basis for far wider operations. Before then further distances required more than one campaigning phase, or—far more common if some degree of political control was sought—it required elaborate negotiations with local allies regarding supplies.#
Liquid markets are the basic prerequisite to industrialization and growth. But where do liquid markets come from? A naïve libertarian might say that markets are self-organizing, and economic growth picked up historically when governments simply stepped out of the way.
While there are certainly some respects in which this is true, . . .
One doesn’t need much detailed historical knowledge to be struck by
just how recent many of the most deeply held moral and political
convictions in the modern West are. Prior to just a few hundred years
ago, it would have been considered eccentric (at best) or seditious (at
worst) to . . .
A great variety of political philosophies, libertarian, anarchist, pacifist, and even leftist, are essentially animated by some sentiment like Mr. Wollstein’s above. The appeal is obvious: a separate morality for collective action feels inconsistent. And more practically, it would seem to make it a lot easier for state actors to . . .