Tyler Cowen, Scott Sumner, and Arnold Kling have all given their macro frameworks. It’s a good exercise, even if I’m a little late to the party. So, here are the basic propositions with which I approach the world.
A few notes beforehand: mine starts a bit further back than the examples so far. I’ve tried to be more systematic; the list starts with epistemology and ends with macroeconomics. It might seem like a mismatch of momentousness, but since I’m a specialist to some extent, I’ve tried to organize the points to reflect an approximately equal amount of mental energy spent on each major point, with a broad trajectory from general to specific.
1. The universe is intelligible.
- On its face, this is a statement about the mind, not about the universe.
- Intelligibility is defined as exhibiting order, or patterns. Nevertheless, I don’t think order is an entirely subjective concept, so I take the statement to imply something about the universe as well.
2. The language faculty – i.e. the recursive manipulation of arbitrary symbols – is the decisive difference between human and animal consciousness.
- It is not, however, a “finely tuned” symbolic logic system like a computer; rather, a bundle of heuristics which act “as if” they were a logic machine.
- Recursive logic is unique to human cognition, but not necessarily the dominant feature all the time. Heuristics can be exploited, though in high stakes games they can be deliberately overridden (see below, “demand curves slope downward”)
3. The fact-value distinction is irreducible.
- Perception is filtered and structured by pre-conscious judgements about the significance of various aspects. This judgement (“theory”) is not essentially different from value judgements which operate on the conscious level.
- Raw factual data, therefore, never speak for themselves. They must be interpreted – i.e. significance must be imputed to them. It is better to do this explicitly than implicitly.
4. Variation and selection are necessary and sufficient to explain complex order.
- Value judgements about any particular order cannot be coherently made without 1) a value judgement on its selection mechanism (what it selects for and how strongly), and 2) a specification of the alternative.
- The rules which govern a complex order can themselves arise within another complex order. Biology ultimately reduces to chemistry – at least in principle; it may be impossible in practice to interpret an order on the basis of its “parent” order. Still, in terms of the patterns of particular elements, the containing order must necessarily be more complex than the contained. This is why conscious design – the result of several levels of complex order – is severely limited in its potential complexity compared to higher levels of complex order.
5. Wherever possible, we should prefer to rely on known ordering forces rather than conscious planning for social arrangements.
- Markets select strongly for the satisfaction of consumer wants. The deliberate abrogation of market outcomes, on the other hand, sets in motion an ordering process which is poorly understood, highly unpredictable, and fails to select for desirable results.
- In other words, apparatus cost is the decisive argument against most policy, regardless of its particular merits.
6. Demand curves slope downward; supply curves slope upward.
- In other words, “Incentives matter”. An increase in the cost of some activity results in a marginal reduction in that activity; an increase in the return to some activity results in a marginal increase in that activity.
- In economics, “cost” and “return” must be understood subjectively. However, these notions can be used in an “as if” manner to illuminate the workings of selection mechanisms in general, even without intentionality on the part of the things being selected for (e.g. why game theory works in evolutionary biology).
7. The frictions in a selection process are just as analytically important as the selection process itself.
- For example, the concrete forms of economic order are shaped by the form of transaction costs. This makes sense if the selection mechanism operates on the basis of cost, inclusive of frictions – as it usually does, in some form or another (see #6).
- Indeed, the very idea of frictions as distinct from constraints, or transaction costs as distinct from costs more generally, requires the analyst to hold the structure of the higher-level order fixed (see #4). This may or may not be a legitimate assumption, but again it is better to state the relevant alternative explicitly rather than implicitly.
8. Economic organization, not (just) technical progress, is the key to economic growth and development.
- Advanced technology requires an extremely fine division of labor.
- All the technological knowledge in the world will not save a civilization from collapse if it should fail to organize itself along low-transaction-cost lines – hence the “dark ages” following the collapse of Rome’s money economy (see the next point).
9. The two most significant transaction-cost-reducing innovations in human history so far have been liberalism and monetary exchange.
- A well-functioning, stable, and standardized monetary system substantially reduces haggling costs and the necessity for trust in making anonymous exchange.
- Liberalism – both as a policy norm (the rule of law) and a set of personal norms (the commercial virtues; respect for others’ rights to life, liberty, and property) – expands the pool of trustworthy trading partners to a historically unprecedented level.
- Modern civilization is organized at such a degree of complexity that both of these elements are likely necessary to keep transaction costs low enough to sustain it.
10. Social norms are generally not rationally justifiable; they must be accepted either tout court or on the basis of a mythology.
- Social norms allow social selection mechanisms to operate with a minimum of friction by legitimizing their results. Liberalism, for example, reduces frictions by legitimizing the market as a selection mechanism.
- The mythology of liberalism (natural rights) being now widely recognized as a mythology, the market continues, albeit with increasing frictions. The greatest practical threat is rent-seeking (an alternative selection mechanism) and leftism in its various strands, broadly speaking (a set of social and policy norms with their own mythologies, which legitimizes certain forms of rent-seeking)
11. Increasing returns are the primary explanandum in economic development and international trade.
- Hence the uselessness of the Solow model. The division of labor is the primary driver of increasing returns (see #8).
- Increasing returns take the form of mutual feedback between two elements (for example, the volume of trade and the division of labor). They therefore do not imply the feasibility of a “big push”: if one element proceeds too far out of lockstep with the other, the result will most likely be waste.
- Institutional path dependence – being stuck at a local optimum, lacking some aspect of liberalism or low-friction monetary exchange – is a huge, and perhaps the main, obstacle to development worldwide.
12. Say’s Law works.
- Economic progress is driven by increases in the supply of goods; not the demand for goods (which in turn is driven by #8). An economic theory which gets this backward will be hopelessly confused on nearly every important macroeconomic issue.
- Prices do not adjust instantly, so there is some room for short-run demand-driven fluctuations. To the extent an economy is characterized by liberalism and low-friction monetary exchange however, the short-run will be tolerably short.
13. Short-run demand fluctuations depend only on the total volume of spending.
- These probably characterize most depressions and bubbles.
- If these are to be stabilized (i.e. monetary pressure on prices avoided), monetary policy can do so far more effectively and with a lower apparatus cost than fiscal policy. The former can engineer a “pure” short-run demand boost; the latter is primarily redistributive. Consumption spending is not an important economic magnitude for nearly any question.
- NGDP targeting is probably a modest improvement over the current monetary regime in this respect. Gross Output targeting is probably even better, to the extent that it targets total spending rather than final spending – at least if its reliability (expected variation around the “true” value) is not significantly worse than NGDP’s. Targeting a Divisia aggregate would probably be substantially similar to an NGDP target except in the case of large exogenous changes in the demand for the services of money.
- However, #5 suggests something like Free Banking would be more stable and robust than even an ideal monetary policy target.
14. Banking is important.
- On the asset side of the balance sheet, intermediation ensures a more efficient distribution of changes in the money stock.
- On the liability side, banks in a competitive banking system – even under a central bank – face market pressures to adjust their quantity of circulating liabilities in accordance with the demand for money. Where there is a central bank, this mechanism reduces its epistemic burden: monetary policy does not need to work as hard (see again #5).
- The best argument for central banking is perverse elasticity in the face of changes in the demand for liquidity. The best argument against it, naturally, is apparatus cost.
- In the equation of exchange, M must be understood broadly as the total services of money which exist in the economy, the overwhelming majority of which is serviced by private liabilities. Plugging in the quantity of a single asset (like M0) or a simple addition of heterogeneous classes of assets (like M2) will result in misleading conclusions.
Samuel
Jan 08, 2016 at 18:42 |I can endorse essentially every point but #10. I think norms are reasons for action and therefore inherently rational. 1 through 5 are basically the precepts of a Hegelian. And I’m also a market monetarist. Can I just repost this as my own? ;)
Cameron Harwick
Jan 08, 2016 at 18:49I put in #14 specifically to piss off Sumnerite market monetarists after cozying up to them with #13. Apparently it didn’t work!
Also, I hope this doesn’t mean I have to read Hegel now. I tried it once and understood why Carnap would want to burn philosophy to the ground.
Samuel
Jan 08, 2016 at 20:45Scott Sumner thinks banking is unimportant in the sense of pure macroeconomic theory. I think he’s right on that in the sense that collapsing NGDP causes financial crisis, not the other way around. That doesn’t change the fact that financial intermediation is still super important, and affects how supply and demand shocks interact and propagate.
Samuel
Jan 08, 2016 at 20:55 |http://sweettalkconversation.com/2016/01/08/my-framework/
Brad
Jan 09, 2016 at 1:06 |I really enjoyed this write-up. I’m not superstitious enough to do macro (:D), so unfortunately I don’t have anything I would call a “macro framework” but many of your points are not explicitly macro and broadly edifying (4 and 7 are interesting, and I would love to see an expansion of those, especially the former).
I’ll say I find it fascinating that while i don’t disagree with many of your points, I use very few of them in my personal work. I do, however, take some disagreement with points 5, 10, and 12 (and maybe 8). Mostly, I want to emphasize that the distinction between the market and other ordering mechanisms (and jointly, the distinction between Sowell’s empiricism and rationalism) is far more blurry than your framework implies.
If I have time next week I may try to respond to those points (the tl;dr would be “Samuels’ ineluctable necessity of choice, Diamond coconut model, McCloskey AND Marx, flavored with behaviorism and Burke”). But who knows, my intuition is that what works for me in micro and policy analysis probably will not translate to anything resembling a full-fledged macro framework.
Cameron Harwick
Jan 09, 2016 at 1:17You’re right about the distinctiveness of “the market”. I guess the way I meant it here is one particular well-understood, powerful, and benign selection mechanism among a panoply of selectors for social behavior – in particular the one involving monetary exchange and lubricated by the norm “liberalism”, without denying the importance of other mechanisms lubricated by other norms.
Don’t feel the need to make it a macro framework; I took the exercise to be something like “articulate your worldview in a bulleted list”. Macro just happens to be the thing I think a lot about. None of the things in your tl;dr list ring any bells for me, so I’ll look forward to reading it!
B Cole
Jan 09, 2016 at 20:49 |Lots to like in this post.
One quibble: if you look at the federal government, I’m not sure it’s lefties or righties that make more market intrusions. Most of your income and capital gains taxes are consumed by national security, if you include the Department of Defense, the VA, the Department of Homeland Security, the black budget and prorated debt. Add in the USDA, the Department of Commerce and heavy rural subsidies, and remember ethanol, and it becomes a question of which party is worse. By the way, the VA runs a large, purely communist healthcare program.
Then consider ubiquitous property zoning in every municipality in the United States, and guess who takes an intense interest in zoning – – property owners.
The righties do blab about free enterprise more.
Cameron Harwick
Jan 09, 2016 at 22:16You’re right as far as day to day politics. However, in the Right’s case that seems to be more due to a lack of principles than any real normative threat. “Rightism” as a political disposition is characterized by particularism; the US just had the good fortune that liberalism was a big part of its particulars for a while, hence the blab about free enterprise by its right-wingers. So there’s really not a coherent global rightist ideology in the same way as there is for leftism (which is not, of course, to deny the many varieties of leftism), so i don’t think of it as a threat separate from unprincipled and (for that reason) friction-laden rent seeking.
Ray Lopez
Jan 09, 2016 at 21:03 |Author says: “However, #5 suggests something like Free Banking would be more stable and robust than even an ideal monetary policy target.” – well said. To quote a folk song, ‘if it’s good enough for grandpa, it’s good enough for me’. The 19th century did OK (see Maddison on the data) on a free or managed Gold Standard. No reason it can’t work again now.
Prakash
Jan 11, 2016 at 2:59 |Hi Cameron,
Good writing. I’m another reader from Moneyillusion. :)
I have a question regarding free banking vs a targeted monetary policy. When people mention free banking, very few go ahead to answer the question about what currency the government taxes in. Because eventually that becomes the money of the realm and the management of that medium of account (monetary policy) becomes important.
One way I might see a way around that would be every government employee declaring her acceptable currency basket and the government aggregates these and declares that it will accept currencies in that proportion. Even within such a setup, I can envisage a gresham’s law race occurring where people seek to unload weaker currencies and accept stronger ones until many years later, we will be down to one currency.
In short, I don’t believe that leaving it to free bankers is going to answer the monetary policy question.
Cameron Harwick
Jan 11, 2016 at 14:27I don’t see this as a huge problem. You pay taxes right now with a check or straight from your bank account; i.e. using liabilities of Wells Fargo or Bank of America, etc., which get settled at the clearinghouse (the Fed does this now, but didn’t always). You don’t send cash to the government. Same with free banking. The usual conception (and the historical experience) is many currencies (bank liabilities) using the same unit of account, denominated in terms of some “outside” (base) money. Other than the fact that the government controls the issue of base money now, the situation isn’t all that different from what we do today.
So the government doesn’t have to throw its weight behind a particular medium of exchange; presumably it would be able to accept any liability that its bank accepts at par, no different from today. It may have to throw its weight behind a unit of account – but that’s subject to such strong network externalities that it probably has to be a “convention taker” rather than a “convention maker” in most cases. Similarly, the US doesn’t have an official language, but the government would have a hard time governing using anything but English.
That said, you’re probably right that the political economy of free banking is underdeveloped. The government will have to use a bank – but that tends to morph into “give me favorable loans/buy my bonds and I’ll give you privileges”, which gets the ball rolling toward central banking. So the constitutional issue is central: how does a government credibly commit not to go down that road? I don’t think I’ve read anything specifically addressing this question, but it probably requires a government that doesn’t constitute an overwhelming portion of GDP, which would de facto privilege whatever bank it used.
And that, in turn, depends on a deep normative commitment to liberalism on the part of the population.