Our term “will” denotes only the resulting intention, leaving out any special reference to thought, instinct, or emotion as possible sources of that intention. Greek, on the other hand, is able to express intention only together with one of its causes, but never in its own right.#
If it is a matter of pure chance that a man should act in one way rather than another, he may be free, but he can hardly be responsible.#Quoted in Philippa Foot, “Free Will as Involving Determinism” (1957)
‘Tis only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions. . . . Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform’d them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil.#Quoted in Philippa Foot, “Free Will as Involving Determinism” (1957)
Man has the power to suppress instinctive desires, he has a will of his own, he chooses between incompatible ends. In this sense he is a moral person; in this sense he is free. However, it is not permissible to interpret this freedom as independence of the universe and its laws.#
Freedom of the will does not mean that the decisions that guide a man’s action fall, as it were, from outside into the fabric of the universe and add to it something that had no relation to and was independent of the elements which had formed the universe before.#
Since the word ‘free’ has been formed to describe a certain subjective experience and can scarcely be defined except by reference to that experience, it could at most be asserted that the term [free will] is meaningless. But this would make any denial of the existence of free will as meaningless as its assertion.#
Moral actions take their complexion solely from the nature of the motives which produce them, while actions which spring from no motive at all, even though prompted by a self-determining power, are sufficiently dignified by the name of folly.#
There never was an instance of an Arminian who did not, like every body else, think that he was perfectly right in pronouncing men virtuous or vicious precisely in proportion to the strength and inveteracy of inclination and habit; and in resenting injury, not a whit the less in compassion to that desperate malignity of the passions which had inflicted it.#
Voluntary, then, is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the state he is in, to its absence or change; though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.#
It is as insignificant to ask whether man’s will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square . . . Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.#
If it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do, when we say the will orders, and the will is free), it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which these actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion; as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties, by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking.#
The question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free.#
In the 1960s, the notion of social constructionism began to take hold: that antisocial behavior is mostly the fault of society, rather than the individual himself, and therefore that criminal justice should focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment. One can’t, after all, be held responsible for his upbringing.
More recently, advances . . .
“If you’re doing what you’re doing for reward and punishment, it’s not really morality.” I’ve seen this trope more than once in Atheist circles, that traditional religious morality is somehow less moral for being reward-oriented. Atheists, it is contended, are more moral for doing the right thing – not for . . .