Humans routinely expect literal meanings to be false, uninformative, banal and/or irrelevant. We may have recourse to a shared code, but that’s never enough. In real life, successful communication presupposes inferential abilities… If language works at all, in other words, it’s because humans have a sense of humour, can detect irony, cope with metaphor, enjoy the absurd. The system works, in short, because we are willing to rejoice in patent falsehoods, valuing them as windows into our own and one another’s minds.#
Only where meanings don’t matter is ‘syntactical’ complexity free to evolve.#
Zahavi’s… move was to divide ‘natural selection’ into two distinct categories. First, ‘utilitarian selection’ – selection for ever greater efficiency in, say, locomotion, circulation or vision. The other category is what Zahavi terms ‘signal selection’, whose logic is the reverse. Signal selection (which includes sexual selection) is selection for ‘wastefulness’.#
No physical entity, then, can be digital in itself. An object’s changing states may serve as digits, but only to a receiver programmed to ignore intermediate states.#
The communicative use of language presupposes anomalously high levels of mutual cooperation and trust – levels beyond anything which current Darwinian theory can explain.#
Since Bitcoin’s invention in 2009, permissionless blockchain technology has gone through several waves of interest and development. While applications related to payments have advanced at breakneck speed, progress in financial and nonmonetary applications have largely failed to live up to initial excitement. This chapter considers the incentives facing network participants . . .
Despite the past decade’s rapid innovation in adapting blockchain technology to new uses, financial intermediation remains elusive except in basic and highly collateralized forms. We introduce the concept of the technical frontier to delimit the kinds of interactions that can feasibly be structured algorithmically among pseudonymous agents, as on a . . .
If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require a divergence between subjective preferences and objective payoffs – a “noble lie”. This implies the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; . . .