Rothbardian critics of fractional reserve banking (FRB) tend to use natural-rights-esque arguments, even when not explicitly invoking natural rights. That is, they take for granted not only the perspicuity of some definition of property, but also the obviousness of its application to any situation. Hülsmann, for example, argues that, “on . . .
Natural law is an attempt to derive normative rules from the nature of things. Natural law doctrines vary widely in their particulars, but ultimately they are united by an epistemological claim that moral obligations are perspicuous. People can know what they are supposed to do, and can be held morally . . .
Most modern political philosophy is built upon the first principle of human rights. Of course, even from this starting point, political philosophies diverge wildly on what they consider among those rights. Clearly one cannot have an enforceable right to everything. In principle, there must be a way to distinguish useful . . .
What we mean by “law” is a question germane both to religious and political philosophy. In some sense, it just seems to mean “necessity”. This seems to be the usage in Romans 7:23, where Paul talks about “another law” in his members waging war against the law of the Lord . . .